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Abstract. The optimal reinsurance arrangement is identified whenever the reinsurer
counterparty default risk is incorporated in a one-period model. Our default risk
model allows the possibility for the reinsurer to fail paying in full the promised
indemnity, whenever it exceeds the level of regulatory capital. We also investigate
the change in the optimal solution if the reinsurance premium recognises or not
the default in payment. Closed form solutions are elaborated when the insurer’s
objective function is set via some well-known risk measures. It is also discussed the
effect of reinsurance over the policyholder welfare. If the insurer is Value-at-Risk
regulated, then the reinsurance does not increase the policyholder’s exposure for
any possible reinsurance transfer, even if the reinsurer may default in paying the
promised indemnity. Numerical examples are also provided in order to illustrate and
conclude our findings. It is found that the optimal reinsurance contract does not
usually change if the counterparty default risk is taken into account, but one should
consider this effect in order to properly measure the policyholders’s exposure. In
addition, the counterparty default risk may change the insurer’s ideal arrangement
if the buyer and seller have very different views on the reinsurer’s recovery rate.
Keywords and phrases : Counterparty Default Risk, Distorted Risk Measure, Ex-
pected Policyholder Deficit, Premium Principle, Optimal Reinsurance, Value-at-Risk.
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21. Introduction
Two parties are involved in a standard reinsurance contract: the insurer, cedent, insurance buyer,
or even simpler, buyer, who has an interest in transferring part of its risk to the reinsurer, also known
as insurance seller, or even simpler seller. Let X ≥ 0 be the total amount that the insurer is liable
to pay during the duration of the insurance contract, with distribution function denoted by F (·)
and survival function F¯ (·) = 1−F (·). In addition, the right end-point xF := inf{z ∈ ℜ : F (z) = 1}
of the loss distribution could be either finite or infinite, even though the finiteness assumption
would be more realistic. The reinsurance seller agrees to pay, R[X], the amount by which the
entire loss exceeds the insurer amount, I[X]. Thus, I[X] + R[X] = X. There are many possible
reinsurance arrangements, which depend on the particular choice of the insurer and reinsurer sharing
the premiums and underwritten risks. For example, the liabilities are shared in a fixed proportion
under proportional reinsurance and therefore I[X] = cX, where c ∈ [0, 1]1 is a constant. Another
common arrangement is the stop-loss reinsurance contracts, for which the buyer retained loss is
limited to a fixed amount, M , known as retention limit. The net amount paid by the insurer is
therefore given by min{X,M} := X ∧M .
There is a vast literature on identifying the optimal risk transfer contract between two insurance
companies within a one-period setting. The first attempts are attributed to Borch (1960) and Arrow
(1963) where the expected utility is maximised. Further extensions have been developed for various
decision criteria that depend on the risk measure choice (for example, see Heerwaarden et al., 1989,
Young, 1999, Kaluska, 2001 and 2005, Verlaak and Beirlant, 2003, Kaluszka and Okolewski, 2008,
Ludkovski and Young, 2009). Two commonly used in practice risk measures, Value-at-risk (VaR)
and Expected Shortfall (ES), are considered by Cai et al. (2008), Cheung (2010) and Chi and Tan
(2011). The classical risk model setting has been successfully studied in the literature by Centeno
and Guerra (2010) and Guerra and Centeno (2008 and 2010), where a natural choice for optimisation
is the maximisation of the adjustment coefficient.
The classical approach of finding the optimal risk sharing ignores the possibility of default in
payment that the risk transfer initiator is exposed to, known as the counterparty default risk.
This can be viewed as a special case of the background risk, under the additive background risk
assumption. This setting has been investigated by Dana and Scarsini (2007) via the expected utility
maximisation. The paper of Biffis and Millossovich (2012) is related to the latter work and analyses
the effect of counterparty default risk under some economic constraints. Bernard and Ludkovski
(2012) deals with the same problem, but the loss given default is considered loss-dependent. Our
approach is different, in the sense that the insurer prefers a risk measure when making a decision
of sharing the liability. In addition, the default is assumed to be endogenous as it has been seen in
Biffis and Millossovich (2012), and the seller’s available assets are given by its regulatory capital.
That is, the loss of basic own funds which the insurer would incur if the insurance seller defaults,
known as the loss given default, is assumed to be proportional to the excess of the indemnity over
the reinsurer level of capital requirements. Like any other counterparty default risk model, there
are pros and cons for our choice, and we believe that our model is sufficiently rich to provide an
understanding of the change in the optimal arrangement if the buyer incorporates the reinsurer
chance to default.
3As it has been anticipated, the reinsurer’s default in payment is assumed to occur whenever the
indemnity exceeds the reinsurer capital. Motivated by the Solvency II regulatory requirements
developed within the European insurance industry, where the risk exposures are measured via VaR,
we assume that the seller operates in an environment that is VaR regulated. The latter assumption
enables us to identify the solution of an infinite dimensional optimisation problem by imposing
mild and economically sound restrictions for the set of possible risk transfers. Alternatively, one
may commit to a specific class of reinsurance contracts, such as focusing only on the stop-loss
arrangements, which allows one to solve standard finite dimensional optimisation problems.
The VaR of a generic loss variable Z at a confidence level a, V aRa(Z), represents the minimum
amount of capital that makes the insurance company to be solvent at least a% of the time. The
mathematical formulation is then given by
V aRa(Z) := inf{z ≥ z0 : Pr(Z ≤ z) ≥ a},
where z0 := sup{z ∈ ℜ : Pr(Z ≤ z) = 0} represents the left end point of the distribution of Z. By
convention, inf ∅ = +∞ is true.
In the absence of default risk, the indemnity is R[X], otherwise it is given by
R˜[X; δ] := R[X] ∧ V aRβ
(
R[X]
)
+ δ
(
R[X]− V aRβ
(
R[X]
))
+
,
where δ ∈ [0, 1] represents the recovery rate used to calculate the loss given default. By definition,
(z)+ = max{z, 0}. Note that the seller is assumed to be VaR-regulated, and for example, β = 99.5%
whenever Solvency II is in force. Thus, the probability of default is 1 − β, i.e. the insolvency
probability allowed by the regulator. Obviously, the no-default scenario is recovered if we set δ = 1.
The seller and buyer may have different beliefs about the recovery rate, but it is likely that the
insurer to be more pessimistic than the reinsurer. In this paper, it is assumed that 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤ 1,
where δ1 and δ2 are the recovery rates of the buyer and seller, respectively. Let P
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
be
the reinsurance premium if the seller incorporates the default risk. Therefore, the total insurer loss
becomes
L˜[X; δ1, δ2] := X − R˜[X; δ1] +P
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
.
A large class of such risk measures is given by
ϕ(Z) :=
∫ 1
0
V aRs(Z)Φ(s) ds =
∫ ∞
0
g
(
Pr(Z > z)
)
dz −
∫ 0
−∞
(
g
(
Pr(Z > z)
)
− 1
)
dz, (1.1)
where Φ(s) = g′(1− s). This class is known as the distorted (see Wang and Young, 1998 and Jones
and Zitikis, 2003) and spectral (see Acerbi, 2002) class of risk measures, respectively. Note that the
distorted function g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is assumed to be non-decreasing and concave such that g(0) = 0
and g(1) = 1. Therefore, g(·) is differentiable almost everywhere, but not necessarily differentiable
on [0, 1]. Consequently, using the usual derivative g′(·), whenever it exists, does not change the
representation from 1.1 (for further details, see Dhaene et al., 2012).
The previously-mentioned class includes the well-known ES risk measure, which has various rep-
resentations in the literature (see Acerbi and Tasche, 2002). We only refer to the next definition:
ESα(Z) :=
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
V aRs(Z) ds = V aRα(Z) +
1
1− α
E
(
Z − V aRα(Z)
)
+
.
4Interestingly, this risk measure is a special case of the Haezendonck-Goovaerts class, which was
introduced many years ago by Haezendonck and Goovaerts (1982). Further details can be found in
Bellini and Rosazza Gianin (2012), Goovaerts et al. (2004 and 2012) and the references therein.
We aim to identify the optimal arrangement that reduces the seller’s risk as much as possible,
where the risk is evaluated via VaR or a distorted risk measure. VaR and ES are standard tail risk
measures used in practice to set technical provisions and capital requirements, and therefore, it is
natural to believe that both are good choices for the insurance company to base its decision. That
is, we intend to minimise ϕI
(
L˜[X; δ1, δ2]
)
over a set of feasible reinsurance contracts, where ϕI(·)
represents a measure of the risk taken by the insurer. In order to avoid potential moral hazard
issues related to the reinsurance arrangement, the set of feasible contracts is given by
F :=
{
R(·) : I(x) = x−R(x) and R(x) are non− decreasing functions
}
.
Note that R ∈ F implies that I and R are 1-Lipschitz functions, i.e. |I(y) − I(x)| ≤ |y − x| and
|R(y)−R(x)| ≤ |y − x| are true for all x, y ≥ 0.
The premiums are usually assumed to be positively loaded, and therefore it is expected to have
that P
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
≥ E
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
. A common insurance pricing is the expected value principle,
P
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
= (1 + c)E
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
, where c > 0 is known as the security loading factor. Our
results are given for a more general pricing method, where the seller prices the premium based on a
distorted risk measure. That is, P
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
= (1 + c)ϕR
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
, where ϕR(·) is a distorted risk
measure. Besides its general formulation, distorted risk measure have proved to be valuable choices
for insurance pricing (see for example, Wang, 2000).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 investigates the VaR-based decisions,
while Section 3 evaluates optimal arrangements based on distorted risk measures. Section 4 explains
the effect of reinsurance over the policyholder welfare. The last section provides some numerical
examples that are meant to illustrate our main results and conclude the paper.
2. VaR-based Optimal Reinsurance Contract
The current section describes the optimal choice for the buyer if VaR measures its perception
about risk. In other words, we assume that ϕI = V aRα. As a result of the translation invariance
property of this risk measure, our optimisation problem is reduced to
min
R∈F
{
V aRα
(
X − R˜[X; δ1]
)
+ (1 + c)ϕR
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)}
. (2.1)
Throughout this paper, two heavily used notations are given by t∗ = sup
{
t ≥ 0 : gR(t) ≤ 1/(1+c)
}
and t∗1 = sup
{
t ≥ 0 : gR(t) ≤ δ1/δ2(1+c)
}
, where the gR(·) always refers to the reinsurer’s distorted
function used to settle the reinsurance premium. In addition, it is implicitly assumed that sup ∅ = 0.
In order to simplify our presentation, the following notation is made:
SL(θ) :=
(
X − V aR1−θ(X)
)
.
Our proofs from this section follow a two-stage procedure developed in Asimit et al. (2013 b). The
main result is given in Theorem 2.1, and it illustrates the optimal choice if the buyer and seller have
different views on the reinsurer’s default.
5Theorem 2.1. Let 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤ 1. The VaR-based optimal decision that minimises the insurer
total loss from 2.1 is given by
R∗[X] =


(
SL(t∗)−SL(1−α ∧ β)
)
+
, α≤β or β<α≤1− t∗1(
SL(t∗)−SL(1−α)
)
+
, 1−t∗1<β<α(
SL(t∗)−SL(1−β)
)
+
+SL(t∗1)− SL(1−α), β≤1−t
∗
1<α
. (2.2)
Note 2.1. The seller’s optimal risk increases if δ1 and δ2 increases or decreases, respectively. This
can be explained by the fact that the insurer has more confidence in buying reinsurance once its
perception on reinsurer’s default improves, which is the case for high values of δ1. In turn, lower
δ2’s reduce the reinsurance premium, and therefore the buyer has access to less expensive reinsurance.
Note 2.2. Theorem 2.1 recovers many existing results in the literature. The case in which δ1 = 1,
and δ2 = 1 or β = 1, recovers the insurer’s optimal VaR-based arrangement for various choices of
reinsurance premium when the default is not taken into account, that had been previously found by
Cheung et al. (2011), Chi and Tan (2011) and Asimit et al. (2013 b), among others.
Proof. Note first that x−R˜(x; δ1) and R(x) are non-decreasing and continuous functions. Therefore,
V aRs
(
X − R˜[X; δ1]
)
= V aRs
(
X
)
− R˜
(
V aRs
(
[X]
)
; δ1
)
and V aRs
(
R[X]) = R
(
V aRs
(
X
))
, (2.3)
are true for all 0 < s < 1, due to the co-monotonic property (for details, see Dhaene et al., 2002 a
and b, Denuit et al., 2005). Similarly,
V aRs
(
R˜[X]; δ1
)
= R
(
V aRs(X)
)
∧R
(
V aRβ(X)
)
+ δ1
(
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
−R
(
V aRβ(X)
))
+
. (2.4)
Let us assume that α ≤ β. Thus, as a result of 1.1, 2.3 and 2.4, the objective function from 2.1
becomes
V aRα(X)−R
(
V aRα(X)
)
− (1 + c)δ2R
(
V aRβ(X)
) ∫ 1
β
ΦR(s) ds+
(1 + c)
(∫ β
0
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
ΦR(s) ds+ (1 + δ2)
∫ 1
β
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
ΦR(s) ds
)
Now, using the two-stage procedure elaborated in Asimit et al. (2013 b), the first step is to solve
 minR∈F
∫ β
0
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
ΦR(s) ds+ (1 + δ2)
∫ 1
β
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
ΦR(s) ds
subject to R
(
V aRα(X)
)
= ξ1, R
(
V aRβ(X)
)
= ξ2
, (2.5)
where (ξ1, ξ2) ∈ D =
{
0 ≤ ξ2 − ξ1 ≤ V aRβ(X) − V aRα(X), 0 ≤ ξ1 ≤ V aRα(X)
}
are some
parameters. Proposition 2.1 from Asimit et al. (2013 b) shows that 2.5 is solved by
R∗[X; ξ1, ξ2] :=
(
X − V aRα(X) + ξ1
)
+
∧ ξ1 +
(
X − V aRβ(X) + ξ2 − ξ1
)
+
∧ (ξ2 − ξ1).
Note that
(
R∗[X; ξ1, ξ2] − R
∗(V aRβ(X); ξ1, ξ2)
)
+
= 0. Thus, the latter and 1.1 imply that the
second step in solving 2.5 is to minimise on D
H(ξ1, ξ2) := −ξ1 + (1 + c)
(∫ V aRα(X)
V aRα(X)−ξ1
+
∫ V aRβ(X)
V aRβ(X)−(ξ2−ξ1)
)
g
(
Pr(X > x)
)
dx.
6Clearly, D is a simple region with respect to ξ2. In addition, H(·) is non-decreasing with respect to
ξ2, and therefore we have that
H(ξ1, ξ2) ≥ H(ξ1, ξ1) = h(ξ1) = −ξ1 + (1 + c)
∫ V aRα(X)
V aRα(X)−ξ1
g
(
Pr(X > x)
)
dx. (2.6)
Now, h
′
(ξ1) = −1 + (1 + c)g
(
F¯
(
V aRα(X)− ξ1
))
, which implies that
h
′
(ξ1) ≤ 0⇔ F¯
(
V aRα(X)− ξ1
)
≤ t∗ ⇔ V aRα(X)− ξ1 ≥ V aR1−t∗(X).
Therefore, the function from 2.6 is minimised at V aRα(X) − V aR1−t∗(X) if 1 − t
∗ < α, which
replicates 2.2 in this case. Similarly, H(·) attains its global minimum at (0, 0), whenever 1− t∗ ≥ α.
These complete the α ≤ β case.
The mirror case β < α is now investigated, where the objective function becomes
V aRα(X)−R
(
V aRα(X)
)
+ (1− δ1)
(
R
(
V aRα(X)
)
−R
(
V aRβ(X)
))
−
(1 + c)δ2R
(
V aRβ(X)
) ∫ 1
β
ΦR(s) ds+
(1 + c)
(∫ β
0
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
ΦR(s) ds+ (1 + δ2)
∫ 1
β
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
ΦR(s) ds
)
.
As before, the first step is to solve
 minR∈F
∫ β
0
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
ΦR(s) ds+ (1 + δ2)
∫ 1
β
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
ΦR(s) ds
subject to R
(
V aRα(X)
)
= ξ1, R
(
V aRβ(X)
)
= ξ2
, (2.7)
where (ξ1, ξ2) ∈ E =
{
0 ≤ ξ1 − ξ2 ≤ V aRα(X) − V aRβ(X), 0 ≤ ξ2 ≤ V aRβ(X)
}
are some
parameters. Thus, 2.7 is solved by
R∗[X; ξ1, ξ2] :=
(
X − V aRβ(X) + ξ2
)
+
∧ ξ2 +
(
X − V aRα(X) + ξ1 − ξ2
)
+
∧ (ξ1 − ξ2),
as a result of Proposition 2.1 from Asimit et al. (2013 b). The second stage problem is the
minimisation on E of
H(ξ1, ξ2) := (1 + c)
∫ xF
0
g
(
Pr
(
R∗[X; ξ1, ξ2] > x
))
dx− δξ1 − (1− δ)ξ2
= (1 + c)
(∫ V aRβ(X)
V aRβ(X)−ξ2
+δ2
∫ V aRα(X)
V aRα(X)−(ξ1−ξ2)
)
g
(
Pr(X > x)
)
dx− δξ1 − (1− δ)ξ2.
Recall that E is simple region with respect to ξ1. One may get that
dH
dξ1
= (1 + c)δ2g
(
F¯
(
V aRα(X)− ξ1 + ξ2
))
− δ1,
which is non-positive for some ξ2 ≤ ξ1 ≤ V aRα(X)− V aRβ(X) + ξ2, if and only if
F¯
(
V aRα(X)− ξ1 + ξ2
)
≤ t∗1 ⇔ V aRα(X)− ξ1 + ξ2 ≥ V aR1−t∗1(X). (2.8)
Firstly, we assume α ≤ 1− t∗1. Equation 2.8 shows that
dH
dξ1
is always positive, and thus
H(ξ1, ξ2) ≥ H(ξ2, ξ2) = (1 + c)
∫ V aRβ(X)
V aRβ(X)−ξ2
g
(
Pr(X > x)
)
dx− ξ2. (2.9)
7This subcase can be further investigated by following the same steps as given after relation 2.6,
and one may get that the global solution is attained at ξ∗2 =
(
V aRβ(X) − V aR1−t∗(X)
)
+
, which
concludes the β < α ≤ 1− t∗1 scenario.
Secondly, the 1 − t∗1 < β subcase is investigated. Recall that ξ1 − ξ2 ≤ V aRα(X) − V aRβ(X)
should hold, and therefore, 2.8 is always satisfied. Thus,
H(ξ1, ξ2) ≥ H
(
ξ2 + V aRα(X)− V aRβ(X), ξ2
)
holds for all (ξ1, ξ2) ∈ E . The latter function and the right hand side of relation 2.9 differ from a
constant, and as a result, the global minimum are both attained at ξ∗2 =
(
V aRβ(X)−V aR1−t∗(X)
)
+
,
which recovers 2.2 for this subcase.
Thirdly, it is further assumed that β ≤ 1− t∗1 < α. For any fixed ξ2, we have
dH
dξ1
≤ 0 if ξ2 ≤ ξ1 ≤ ξ2 + V aRα(X)− V aR1−t∗
1
(X)
dH
dξ1
> 0 if ξ2 + V aRα(X)− V aR1−t∗
1
(X) < ξ1 ≤ ξ2 + V aRα(X)− V aRβ(X)
,
which yields that H(ξ1, ξ2) ≥ H
(
ξ2 + V aRα(X)− V aR1−t∗
1
(X), ξ2
)
for all (ξ1, ξ2) ∈ E . Once again,
the latter function and the right hand side of relation 2.9 differ from a constant, and thus, both
reach its global minimum at ξ∗2 =
(
V aRβ(X)−V aR1−t∗(X)
)
+
. Thus, the global minimum of H(·) is
attained at (ξ∗1 , ξ
∗
2) with ξ
∗
1 = ξ
∗
2+V aRα(X)−V aR1−t∗1(X), which recovers 2.2 for our final subcase.
The proof is now complete. 
3. Optimal Reinsurance Contract Based on Distortion Risk Measures
In this section, the optimal choice for the buyer is investigated if a general concave distortion
risk measure, ϕI(·), is adopted. In addition, the same premium principle assumption as given in
Section 2 is in force. Therefore, the optimal reinsurance problem is given by:
min
R∈F
{
ϕI
(
X − R˜[X; δ1]
)
+ (1 + c)ϕR
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)}
, (3.1)
where ϕI(·) and ϕR(·) are given by (1.1) with the function g(·) is replaced by distortion functions
gI(·) and gR(·) respectively.
To solve 3.1, the method described in Cui et al. (2012) is used by expressing the objective function
as integrals taken under an identifiable measure of a function that depends on the survival function
of the underlying loss random variable X. For each R ∈ F , we first define ℓR := lim
x→∞
R(x) and
R−1 : [0, ℓR)→ [0,∞), where
R−1(t) := inf{x : R(x) > t}, t ∈ [0, ℓR).
Obviously, R(x) > t if and only if x > R−1(t). The image measure on [0,∞) of the Lebesgue
measure λ on [0, ℓR) under the map R
−1 is denoted as λR(·), i.e.
λR(B) := λ
{
t ∈ [0, ℓR) : R
−1(t) ∈ B
}
for any Borel measurable subset B of [0,∞). Note that, from now on, λ(·) always represents the
Lebesgue measure on the real line. The first step in solving the optimisation problem defined in 3.1
is given in the next lemma.
8Lemma 3.1. For each R ∈ F , the objective function from 3.1 is given by
ϕI
(
X − R˜[X; δ1]
)
+ (1 + c)ϕR
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
= ϕI(X) +
∫
[0,∞)
Θ
(
Pr(X > t)
)
λR(dt),
where
Θ(u) := (1− δ1)gI(u)1{u≤1−β} − gI(u) + (1 + c)gR(u)− (1 + c)(1− δ2)gR(u)1{u≤1−β}, u ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Fix R ∈ F . Since the risk measure ϕI(·) is cash invariant, comonotonic additive and posi-
tively homogeneous (for details, see Denuit et al. 2005), one can derive as in 2.3 and 2.4 that
ϕI
(
X − R˜[X; δ1] + (1 + c)ϕR
(
R˜[X; δ2]
))
(3.2)
= ϕI(X) + (1− δ1)ϕI
((
R[X]−R
(
V aRβ(X)
))
+
)
− ϕI
(
R[X]
)
+ (1 + c)ϕR
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
.
Note that the second term from the right hand side of 3.2 can be rewritten as
ϕI
((
R[X]−R(V aRβ(X))
)
+
)
=
∫ ∞
0
gI
(
Pr
(
R(X) > x+R(V aRβ(X))
))
dx
=
∫ ∞
R(V aRβ(X))
gI
(
Pr
(
R(X) > x
))
dx
=
∫ ℓR
0
1{x≥R(V aRβ(X))}gI
(
Pr
(
X > R−1(x)
))
dx
=
∫ ℓR
0
1{R−1(x)≥V aRβ(X)}gI
(
Pr
(
X > R−1(x)
))
dx
=
∫
[0,∞)
1{t≥V aRβ(X)}gI
(
Pr
(
X > t
))
λR(dt)
=
∫
[0,∞)
1{Pr(X>t)≤1−β}gI
(
Pr
(
X > t
))
λR(dt).
Similarly, the third and fourth terms from the right hand side of 3.2 equal to
ϕI
(
R[X]
)
=
∫
[0,∞)
gI
(
Pr
(
X > t
))
λR(dt).
and
ϕR
(
R˜[X; δ2]
)
=
∫
[0,∞)
gR
(
Pr
(
X > t
))
λR(dt)
−(1−δ2)
∫
[0,∞)
1{Pr(X>t)≤1−β}gR
(
Pr
(
X > t
))
λR(dt),
respectively. Combining all the results, the lemma is fully justified. 
Lemma 3.1 shows that solving 3.1 is a special case of the following more general optimisation
problem:
min
R∈F
∫
[0,∞)
H(t) λR(dt), (3.3)
where H(·) is any real-valued measurable function on [0,∞). The set of optimal solutions from 3.3
is given in Lemma 3.2, where G denotes the set of all measurable functions f : [0,∞) → R with
values in [0, 1] almost everywhere with respect to the Lebesgue measure λ.
9Lemma 3.2. The set of all optimal solutions R∗ ∈ F of Problem 3.3 is given by{
R∗(x) =
∫ x
0
(
1{H(t)<0} + f(t)1{H(t)=0}
)
dt
∣∣∣∣ f ∈ G
}
.
In particular, Problem 3.3 has a unique optimal solution if the set λ{x | H(x) = 0} = 0.
Proof. Recall that
R−1(t) ∈ B → t ∈ R(B) := {R(x); x ∈ B}
and R(B), the image of a Borel measurable set under the Lipschitz map R(·), is Lebesgue measurable
(see Lemma 3.6.3 of Bogachev, 2007), we obtain that λR(B) ≤ λ
(
R(B)
)
for any R ∈ F and Borel
measurable subset B of [0,∞). Moreover, since R(·) is 1-Lipschitz, it follows that λ
(
R(B)
)
≤ λ(B)
(see Lemma 3.10.12 of Bogachev, 2007). Therefore, λR(B) ≤ λ(B), and hence, we can define the
corresponding Radon-Nikodym derivative
0 ≤ DR :=
dλR
dλ
on [0,∞). Denote A := {DR > 1}. If λ(A) > 0, then
λR(A) =
∫
A
DR(t) dt > λ(A),
which is a contradiction. Thus, it can be concluded that 0 ≤ DR ≤ 1 λ-almost surely, and the
objective function from 3.3 can be written as∫
[0,∞)
H(t)DR(t) dt.
It is now clear that in order to minimise the last integral, it is optimal to set DR(t) to 1 whenever
H(t) < 0, and 0 whenever H(t) > 0. On the set {t : H(t) = 0}, the value of DR(t) can be set
arbitrarily. Thus, the above integral is minimised at
D∗R(t) = 1{H(t)<0} + f(t)1{H(t)=0}, (3.4)
for any f ∈ G. Now, it remains to show that an optimal solution R∗(·) of 3.3 can be recovered from
D∗R(·) as defined in 3.4, which is true due to the following relation
R∗(x) = R∗(x)−R∗(0) = λR∗
(
[0, x)
)
=
∫
[0,x)
D∗R(t) dt =
∫ x
0
(
1{H(t)<0} + f(t)1{H(t)=0}
)
dt.
The proof is now complete. 
It is worth mentioning that Cui et al. (2012) provides an alternative way to solve 3.3. They first
show that the density function of the measure λR(·) is equal to R, and then verify the optimality of
the proposed solution by using of the 1-Lipschitz property of R(·). One advantage of our method
is that we provide a constructive, more intuitive and transparent way to find out all the optimal
solutions.
With Lemma 3.2 on hand, we are ready to solve 3.1. For the sake of notational simplicity,
some mild additional assumption are necessary in order to display the optimal solutions. More
specifically, the expected value principle is further assumed for the reason of being able to write
down the solution in a general setting, but any other premium principle can be solved via Lemma 3.2.
The same reason applies to the strictly increasing assumption of F (·). Recall that x0 represents the
10
left end point of the distribution of X, as it has been defined in Section 1. We will first deal with
strictly convex distorted risk measures in Theorem 3.1, while later in Theorem 3.2, a non-strict
distorted risk measure is considered.
Theorem 3.1. Let ∆ := g(1−β)
1−β
. Assume that F (·) is strictly increasing on (x0, xF ), gI(·) is strictly
concave on [0, 1], and gR(x) = x for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the optimal decision that minimises the
insurer total loss from 3.1 is given by the following:
(1) Suppose that 1 < 1 + c < ∆. Let β∗ ∈ (1 − β, 1) be the unique solution of the equation
(1 + c)β = gI(β).
(a) If (1 + c)δ2/δ1 < ∆, then R
∗[X] = SL(β∗).
(b) If ∆ ≤ (1 + c)δ2/δ1 < g
′
I(0), then R
∗[X] = SL(β∗) − SL(1 − β) + SL(β˜), where
β˜ ∈ (0, 1− β] is the unique solution of the equation (1 + c)δ2β/δ1 = gI(β).
(c) If g′I(0) ≤ (1 + c)δ2/δ1, then R
∗[X] ≡ 0.
(2) Suppose that ∆ ≤ 1 + c.
(a) If (1+ c)δ2/δ1 < g
′
I(0), then R
∗[X] = SL(β˜), where β˜ ∈ (0, 1−β] is the unique solution
of the equation (1 + c)δ2β/δ1 = gI(β).
(b) If g′I(0) ≤ (1 + c)δ2/δ1, then R
∗[X] ≡ 0.
Proof. Since all the cases can be proved in a similar manner, we only chose to show Case (1)(b).
Lemma 3.1 and the fact that gR(u) = u for all u yield that 3.1 is equivalent to
min
R∈F
∫
[0,∞)
Θ1
(
F¯ (t)
)
λR(dt),
where
Θ1(u) := (1− δ1)gI(u)1{u≤1−β} − gI(u) + (1 + c)u− (1 + c)(1− δ2)u1{u≤1−β}, u ∈ [0, 1].
Further, Lemma 3.2 implies that any optimal solution R∗ ∈ F to this problem takes the form of
R∗[X] =
∫ X
0
(
1{Θ1(F¯ (t))<0} + f(t)1{Θ1(F¯ (t))=0}
)
dt
for some f ∈ G. It only remains to identify the sets {Θ1(F¯ (t)) < 0} and {Θ1(F¯ (t)
)
= 0}.
Keeping in mind the strictly concavity assumption of of gI(·), it is easy to check that
Θ1(u) < 0⇐⇒ u ∈ (0, β˜) ∪ (1− β, β
∗) and Θ1(u) = 0⇐⇒ u = 0 or β˜ or β
∗.
Therefore, any optimal solution of 3.1 takes the form of
R∗[X] =
∫ X
0
(
1{Θ1(F¯ (t))<0} + f(t)1{Θ1(F¯ (t))=0}
)
dt
=
∫ X
0
1{0<F¯ (t)<β˜} dt+
∫ X
0
1{1−β<F¯ (t)<β∗} dt+
∫ X
0
f(t)1{F¯ (t)=0 or β˜ or β∗} dt
=
∫ X
0
1{xF>t>V aR1−β˜(X)} dt+
∫ X
0
1{V aRβ(X)>t>V aR1−β∗ (X)} dt+ 0
=
(
X − V aR1−β˜(X)
)
+
+
(
X − V aR1−β∗(X)
)
+
−
(
X − V aRβ(X)
)
+
,
where f(·) is any function from G. Note that the last integral from the second step is zero due to
the strictly increasing assumption F (·), which completes our proof. 
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As it can see from the proof of Lemma 3.1, the strict concavity assumption of gI(·) guarantees that
the set {u | Θ1(u) = 0} is finite. The latter together with the strictly increasing assumption of F
suggest that the set {Θ1(F¯ (t)
)
= 0} has zero Lebesgue measure and hence 3.1 is uniquely solved. If
we relax our assumptions, an integral of f ∈ G may appear, but the Lemma 3.2 is still applicable for
such cases. The next theorem provides the optimal arrangements whenever the buyer’s risk appetite
is evaluated by a non-strictly distorted risk measure, such as the ES. To simplify our notation, we
denote by
If (θ1, θ2) :=
∫ X∧V aR1−θ1 (X)
X∧V aR1−θ2 (X)
f(t) dt, f ∈ G, 0 < θ1 < θ2 ≤ 1.
Moreover, whenever δ1 6= 0, we define 1 + C := (1 + c)δ2/δ1, so that 1 < 1 + c ≤ 1 + C.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that F (·) is strictly increasing on (x0, xF ), ϕI = ESα, and gR(x) = x for
all x ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the optimal decision that minimises the insurer total loss from 3.1 is given by
the following:
(1) Suppose that δ1 6= 0 and α > β.
(a) If 1 < 1 + C ≤ 1/(1− β), then R∗[X] = SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
.
(b) If 1/(1− β) < 1 + C < 1/(1− α), then
R∗[X] = SL
(
1/(1 + C)
)
+
(
SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
−SL(1− β)
)
+
.
(c) If 1 + C = 1/(1− α), then for any f ∈ G we have
R∗[X] = If (0, 1− α)+
(
SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
−SL(1− β)
)
+
.
(d) If 1 + C > 1/(1− α), then R∗[X] =
(
SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
−SL(1− β)
)
+
.
(2) Suppose that δ1 6= 0 and α ≤ β.
(a) If 1 + C ≤ 1/(1− α), then R∗[X] = SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
.
(b) If 1 + C = 1/(1− α), then
R∗[X] =

SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
− SL(1− β) + If (0, 1− β) if 1 + c < 1/(1− α)
If (0, 1− α) if 1 + c = 1/(1− α)
.
(c) If 1 + C > 1
1−α
, then for for any f ∈ G we have
R∗[X] =


SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
− SL(1− β) if 1 + c < 1/(1− α)
If (1− β, 1− α) if 1 + c = 1/(1− α)
0 if 1 + c > 1/(1− α)
.
(3) Suppose that 0 = δ1 < δ2 and α > β. Then, for any f ∈ G we have
R∗[X] =

SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
− SL(1− β) if 1 + c ≤ 1/(1− β)
0 if 1 + c > 1/(1− β)
.
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(4) Suppose that 0 = δ1 < δ2 and α ≤ β. Then, for any f ∈ G we have
R∗[X] =


SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
− SL(1− β) if 1 + c < 1/(1− α)
If (1− β, 1− α) if 1 + c = 1/(1− α)
0 if 1 + c > 1/(1− α)
.
(5) Suppose that 0 = δ1 = δ2 and α > β. Then, for any f ∈ G we have
R∗[X] =
(
SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
− SL(1− β)
)
+
+ If (0, 1− β).
(6) Suppose that 0 = δ1 = δ2 and α ≤ β. Then, for any f ∈ G we have
R∗[X] =


SL
(
1/(1 + c)
)
− SL(1− β) + If (0, 1− β) if 1 + c < 1/(1− α)
If (0, 1− α) if 1 + c = 1/(1− α)
If (0, 1− β) if 1 + c > 1/(1− α)
.
The proof is omitted because its technique is the same as that of Theorem 3.1.
4. Expected policyholder deficit
While the optimal reinsurance reflects the buyer’s ideal choice to reduce its exposure, it is not
known if reinsurance creates an advantage to the policyholder. Asimit et al. (2013 a) showed
that some risk transfers within an insurance group may be detrimental to the policyholder if the
counterparty default risk is not properly incorporated when setting the regulatory capital. In this
section, we evaluate the reinsurance impact on policyholder’s welfare by investigating the resulting
Expected Policyholder Deficit (EPD). The policyholder deficit is equal to the difference between
nominal liabilities to policyholders and liabilities that will actually be paid, thus reflecting the
reduction in the payoff received due to potential default. The policyholder deficit can also be seen
as an asset transferred from policyholders to shareholders, reflecting the option of the latter to
default on their obligations (see Butsic, 1994, Phillips et al., 1998, and Myers and Read, 2001).
Formally, the EPD for a generic downside risk Z and available assets c is defined by
EPD(Z; c) = E (Z − c)+ =
∫ xF
c
P (Z > z) dz.
If the capital requirements are V aRγ-based, as it is the case in Solvency II when γ = 99.5%, and
the cedent chooses a reinsurance arrangement R(·) and believes that the reinsurer’s recovery rate
is δ, then the EPD becomes:
EPD[X,R;V aRγ, β, δ] := EPD
(
X − R˜[X; δ];V aRγ
(
X − R˜[X; δ]
))
,
where β represents the level that triggers the seller’s default. Interestingly, we find that any possible
reinsurance arrangement does not increase the EPD. In addition, the policyholder’s exposure is
optimally reduced if the tail risk is transfer by the insurance company. These findings are formalised
in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Let 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ a ≤ V aRγ(X). Then,
a) max
R∈F
EPD[X,R;V aRγ, β, δ] =
∫ xF
V aRγ(X)
F¯ (x) dx and is solved by R∗[X] = h(X; a) ∧ a,
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b) min
R∈F
EPD[X,R;V aRγ, β, δ] = (1− δ)
∫ xF
V aRmax{γ,β}(X)
F¯ (x) dx and is solved by
R∗[X] = h(X; a) ∧ a+
(
X − V aRγ(X)
)
+
,
where h(·; a) is a 1-Lipschitz function such that h(0; a) = 0 and h
(
V aRγ(X); a
)
= a.
Proof. The proof is based on the same technology illustrated in showing the results of Theorem 2.1.
Since both optimisation problems can be proved in the same manner, only part a) is fully explained.
We first rewrite the objective function as follows:
EPD[X,R;V aRγ, β, δ]
= (1− γ)
(
ESγ
(
X − R˜[X; δ]
)
− V aRγ
(
X − R˜[X; δ]
))
=
∫ 1
γ
V aRs(X) ds−
∫ max{γ,β}
γ
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
ds− δ
∫ 1
max{γ,β}
R
(
V aRs(X)
)
ds−
(1− δ)
(
1−max{γ, β}
)
R
(
V aRβ(X)
)
−
(1− γ)
(
I
(
V aRγ(X)
)
+ (1− δ)
(
R
(
V aRγ(X)
)
−R
(
V aRβ(X)
))
+
)
.
As it has already been seen, the first step of our maximisation problem is to include the boundary
conditions R
(
V aRγ(X)
)
= ξ1 and R
(
V aRβ(X)
)
= ξ2 to the initial optimisation problem.
Firstly, if γ ≤ β, then the parameters (ξ1, ξ2) should satisfy 0 ≤ ξ2 − ξ1 ≤ V aRβ(X)− V aRγ(X)
and 0 ≤ ξ1 ≤ V aRγ(X). In addition, the optimal solution is given by:
R∗[X; ξ1, ξ2] = h(X; ξ1) ∧ ξ1 +
(
X − V aRβ(X) + ξ2 − ξ1
)
+
∧ (ξ2 − ξ1),
where h(·; ξ1) is a 1-Lipschitz function such that h(0; ξ1) = 0 and h
(
V aRγ(X); ξ1
)
= ξ1. Thus, the
objective function of the second step is to maximise
EPD
[
X,R∗[X; ξ1, ξ2];V aRγ, β, δ
]
= (1− γ)
(
ESγ(X)− V aRγ(X)
)
− E
[
R˜∗[X; ξ1, ξ2]− ξ1
]
+
= (1− γ)
(
ESγ(X)− V aRγ(X)
)
− E
[
R∗[X; ξ1, ξ2]− ξ1
]
+
= (1− γ)
(
ESγ(X)− V aRγ(X)
)
−
∫ V aRγ(X)
V aRβ(X)−(ξ2−ξ1)
F¯ (x) dx,
over all possible (ξ1, ξ2). Therefore, the condition ξ1 = ξ2 is sufficient to describe the set of optimal
solutions, i.e. R∗[X; ξ1, ξ1], which completes the proof in this case.
Secondly, if γ > β, then 0 ≤ ξ1−ξ2 ≤ V aRγ(X)−V aRβ(X) and 0 ≤ ξ1 ≤ V aRγ(X) should hold.
The first step optimal solution becomes R∗[X; ξ1, ξ2] = h1(X; ξ1, ξ2) ∧ ξ1, where h1(0; ξ1, ξ2) = 0,
h
(
V aRβ(X); ξ1, ξ2
)
= ξ2 and h
(
V aRγ(X); ξ1, ξ2
)
= ξ1. Indeed, the later describes the set of optimal
solutions due to the fact that
EPD
[
X,R∗[X; ξ1, ξ2];V aRγ, β, δ
]
= (1− γ)
(
ESγ(X)− V aRγ(X)
)
− E
[
R˜∗[X; ξ1, ξ2]− ξ1
]
+
= (1− γ)
(
ESγ(X)− V aRγ(X)
)
=
∫ xF
V aRγ(X)
F¯ (x) dx,
14
for any (ξ1, ξ2). The proof is now complete. 
We have tried to understand the effect of reinsurance over the policyholder’s welfare whenever
the buyer is ES-regulated, which still remains an open problem, and it could be possibly developed
in the future. It would be interesting to capture this aspect that is of great interest whenever the
primary insurer operates on the Swiss insurance market, but unfortunately the current available
approaches are not helpful in deriving such results.
5. Numerical examples and conclusions
The main results of this paper concerned with the optimal reinsurance arrangement are sum-
marised in Theorems 2.1, 3.1 and 3.2, and describe the insurer’s ideal choice based on VaR, strictly
convex distorted risk measures and ES, respectively. The effect of counterparty default risk has been
analysed, which augment the existing literature on optimal reinsurance. This section is devoted to
explore some plausible scenarios among the ones considered in these theorems, and understand the
change in EPD as a result of reinsurance risk transfer.
Note that the EPD does not increase as a result of reinsurance, if the buyer is V aRγ-regulated,
as we assume from now on. The latter can be easily justified for a generic risk transfer, R ∈ F .
Clearly, h(x) := x− R˜(x; δ1) is a 1-Lipschitz function, and therefore we have
|h(X)− h
(
V aRγ(X)
)
| ≤ |X − V aRγ(X)| ⇒ EPD[X,R;V aRγ, β, δ] ≤ E
(
X − V aRγ(X)
)
+
.
Therefore, the EPD remains at the maximal possible level if all γ-worst possible outcomes are
covered by the insurer, as it can be seen in Proposition 4.1. On the contrary, the EPD is reduced
to its minimal level once all γ-worst possible outcomes are covered by the reinsurer.
To illustrate our results, let us consider a plausible parameters setting, β = γ = 99.5%, as it is
the case if both insurance players operate in the European market, where Solvency II Regime is
currently implemented. It is likely to assume that the insurer would optimise its VaR decision at
some confidence levels that are less than the regulatory one, i.e. α ≤ 99.5%. Thus, Theorem 2.1
reveals that the insurer’s decision is exactly the same as in the case where the counterparty default
risk is not taken into account. In addition, the EPD stays at its maximal possible level.
The ESα optimal risk transfers are exemplified for some α ∈ {70%, 80%, 90%, 95%}, and expected
value principle with c = 1. Thus, 1+c < 1/(1−α) is always true. Theorem 3.2 gives us the following
two possible optimal reinsurance arrangements
R∗[X] =

SL
(
50%)
)
− SL(0.5%) if 1 + C > 1/(1− α)
SL
(
50%
)
if 1 + C ≤ 1/(1− α)
,
where C = 2δ2/δ1 − 1. The 1 + C ≤ 1/(1 − α) case shows an optimal ES-based decision that
is identical to the corresponding decision when the counterparty default risk is neglected, and
Proposition 4.1 reveals that is optimal for policyholder(s) as well. Whenever 1+C > 1/(1−α), the
ideal reinsurance contract changes as a result of taking into account the counterparty default risk,
and the policyholder(s) have the maximal exposure as we can see from Proposition 4.1. Now, the
recovery rates are assumed to belong from{
(δ1, δ2) : 0% ≤ δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤ 100%, δ1 ∈
{
50%, 75%, 100%
}}
.
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Among all these possible combinations, only the case in which α = 70% with (δ1, δ2) = (50%, 100%)
leads to the 1 + C > 1/(1− α) case.
As a conclusion, the optimal reinsurance contract does not usually change if the counterparty
default risk is taken into account, but one should consider this effect in order to properly measure
the policyholders’s exposure. Our numerical results show that the counterparty default risk may
change the insurer’s ideal arrangement only if the buyer and seller have very different views on the
reinsurer’s recovery rate.
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